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The Individual Versus Society: The
Cultural Dynamics of Criminalizing
Suicide
By BENJAMIN P. FAY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Suicide is universal. It occurs in cultures throughout the world,'
and it has occurred throughout history 2 It is mentioned in the Rig
Veda, the Bible, and the Koran.3
Suicide is very disturbing. It questions one of our most deeply
held assumptions-that life is worth living. It invokes feelings of guilt,
failure, and fear. guilt, that somehow we caused the suicide; failure,
that somehow we could have prevented it; and fear, that other people
will follow the example of the suicide. To assuage these feelings we
often turn to our criminal justice systems, criminalizing assisted sui-
cide,4 attempted suicide, and even suicide itself.
The question of whether to criminalize suicide involves the bal-
ancing of two competing choices: the individual's choice and the soci-
* Member of the Class of 1995. B.A. (Anthropology), University of California at
Berkeley, 1991.
I would like to thank Sarah Caldwell of the Anthropology Department of the Univer-
sity of California at Berkeley for giving me direction in my research of Hindu culture.
I would also like to thank my wife Maria for her continual support and her patience
with the many long nights I spent researching, writing, and editing this Note.
1. See, eg., SUIcDE IN ASIA AND THE NEAR EAST (Lee A. Headley ed., 1983);
WoRD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, REGIONAL OFFICE FOR EUROPE, CHANGING PATrERNS
IN SUICIDE BEHAVIOR (EURO Reports and Studies No. 74,1982); FATIMA MEER, RACE
AND SuicnE IN SOUTH AFRICA (1976)(discussing suicide in Africa); CULTURE, YOUTH
AND SuicIE IN THE PACFI PAPERS FROM AN EAsr-WESr C&MR CONFERNCE (Fran-
cis X. Hezel et al. eds., 1985); Louis L DUBN, SUICmE A SoaOLOGIcAL AND STAmrsn-
CAL STUDY 83-92 (1963)(discussing suicide in primitive cultures).
2. Richard H. Seiden, Suicide: Behavioral Aspects, in ENCYCLoPEDIA OF CRINE AND
JUSnTCE 1521, 1521 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
3. Id.
4. Assisted suicide is the provision of aid or encouragement to a person who commits
suicide. It is essentially passive; the assister does not do the actual killing. If the assister
actively participates, for example by injecting a drug or pulling a trigger, it is generally
considered homicide. Catherine D. Shaffer, Note, Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide,
86 CoL. . L. REV. 348, 351 (1986).
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ety's choice. Balancing these two choices involves weighing the
interest of the individual in choosing her own destiny and the interest
of the society in preserving the lives of its members. 'Whether suicide
should be criminalized depends on whose choice and which interest
the culture places more value. The more value the calture places on
the individual's interest in controlling her own destiny, the less the law
should prevent her from committing suicide. The more value the cul-
ture places on the society's interest in preserving the lives of its mem-
bers, the more the law should restrict the individual's right to commit
suicide. These values, of course, vary from culture to culture and vary
within each culture over time.
Suicide laws must reflect this cultural balance between the inter-
est of the individual and the interest of the society. If they do not,
they will either be unenforceable or inadequate. With laws concern-
ing suicide and attempted suicide, this balancing of interests is fairly
straight forward. There are only two parties concerned: the individ-
ual who commits or tries to commit suicide and the state, as the repre-
sentative of the society, which tries to prevent the individual from
committing suicide. The only issue is whether the state, can try to pre-
vent the individual from performing her act. The state and the indi-
vidual represent the two competing interests, and the issue is reduced
to the balancing of these two interests.
Laws concerning assisted suicide, however, are considerably more
complicated. While suicide and attempted suicide involve only the in-
dividual's choice and the society's choice, the issue in assisted suicide
is clouded by the intervention of the third party-the assister. It is no
longer only the individual who chooses to die. The assister also
chooses for the individual to die.5 In cases in which the individual's
choice to commit suicide is unclear, and the assister's choice is promi-
nent, assisted suicide begins to resemble murder. In such cases, even
though suicide and attempted suicide may be legal, it is often cultur-
ally viable to criminalize certain types of assisted suicide.
An examination of the history of suicide laws in England and In-
dia reveals this balance of culturally determined values. In both coun-
tries the decision to criminalize or not to criminalize suicide has been
couched in terms of the individual's interest versus the society's inter-
est. Although these two countries are culturally very different, both
of their histories demonstrate that suicide laws which do not accu-
5. Of course, in many cases the assister does not actually want the individual to die.
Nonetheless, by choosing to give aid the assister has chosen for the individual to die.
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rately reflect the culture are unenforceable. Furthermore, their histo-
ries also illustrate the added complexity of assisted suicide and the
apparent paradox that it can be culturally viable to make assisted sui-
cide illegal even when suicide is not. Lessons can be drawn from these
countries' experiences to guide the United States as we grapple with
the question of whether to criminalize assisted suicide.
H. SUICIDE LAWS IN ENGLAND
A. Suicide
Under English common law suicide was a felony.6 Blackstone
classified it as "felonious homicide."7 He considered it "self-mur-
der."' Suicide was classified as murder because it consisted of the
same elements-the taking of a life with malice aforethought.
Hales v. Petit,9 one of the earliest reported English suicide cases,
illustrates the legal logic behind this classification. A coroner's jury
had determined that Sir James Hales had committed suicide by
drowning himself in a river.10 The court observed that Sir James
Hales had murdered himself with malice aforethought.1 '
[A]s to the quality of the offence which Sir James has here commit-
ted ... it is in a degree of murder, and not of homicide or man-
slaughter, for homicide is the killing of a man feloniously without
malice prepense, but murder is the killing a man with malice pre-
pense. And here the killing of himself was prepensed and resolved
in his mind before the act was done.
12
To this line of reasoning, the fact that the perpetrator and the victim
were the same person did not change the conclusion.13 The court sim-
ply explained that "Sir James Hales being alive caused Sir James
Hales to die; and the act of the living man was the death of the dead
man.
14
6. Seiden, supra note 2, at 1526.
7. 4 Wu-LLAm BI.ACKsToNE *188.
8. Id. at *189. Blackstone expressed his disdain for suicide when he referred to it as
"the pretended heroism, but real cowardice, of the Stoic philosophers, who destroyed
themselves to avoid those ills which they had not the fortitude to endure." Id.
9. Hales v. Petit, 75 Eng. Rep. 387 (KB. 1561-62).
10. Id at 390.
11. Id at 399.
12. Id.
13. Id at 401.
14. Id
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Punishing people who had committed suicide was problematic.
Unlike other felons, they could not be executed.15 However, an at-
tempt could be made to deter would-be suicides by punishing that
which would survive their deaths-their material possessions and
their souls. Their material possessions were punished by forfeiting all
of their goods and chattels to the king.1 6 Their souls were punished by
denying them Christian burials. They were buried at night at cross-
roads in the highway with stakes driven through their bodies.17 It was
hoped that these measures would cause prospective suicides, out of
fear for the welfare of their families and their souls, to forgo their
intended act.18
When the reasons given by the English courts for criminalizing
suicide are considered, it becomes apparent that the courts had de-
cided that the society's interest in preserving the lives of its members
outweighed the individual's interest in self-determination. Suicide
was criminalized because the courts considered it an offense against
both God and king.' 9 It was an offense against God because it vio-
lated the commandment "thou shalt not kill,"2 0 and, as Blackstone
explained, because the suicide "invad[ed] the prerogative of the Al-
mighty... rushing into his immediate presence uncalled for."'" God
brought each person into this world and it was God's choice to decide
when each person should leave; it was not the individual's choice. Sui-
cide was an offense against the king because it deprived him of a sub-
jectP and because it set a bad example for his other subjects.23 The
king had a right to punish people who committed suicide because he
"ha[d] an interest in the preservation of all his subjects. ' 24 The king's
interest outweighed the individual's interest. When the courts were
considering the interests of God and king, they were considering what
they believed to be the interest of the society.
However, the determination by the courts that the society's inter-
est outweighed the individual's interest did not accurately reflect the
15. See id. at 398.
16. Id. at 397, 400.
17. 4 WI.L~m BAcc roNE *190; Dennis E. Hoffnan & Vincent J. Webb, Suicide as
Murder at Common Law: Another Chapter in the Falsification of Consensus Theory, 19
CMNOLOGY 372, 374-75 (1981).
18. 4 WmLIAm BLAawoNEr *190.
19. Id. at *189; Hales v. Petit, 75 Eng. Rep. at 400.
20. Hales v. Petit, 75 Eng. Rep. at 400.
21. 4 WmIIM BLAcKS'or *189.
22. Hales v. Petit, 75 Eng. Rep. at 400.
23. Id,
24. 4 WLLIAm BLAcKnSOrNE *189.
[Vol. 18:591
The Cultural Dynamics of Criminalizing Suicide
values of the culture. This resulted in a form of legal activism by the
coroners' juries, whose job it was to determine the cause of death.p
The coroners' juries knew that if a person was insane when he com-
mitted suicide, then his actions were not criminal.26 He would receive
a proper burial, and his estate would not be forfeited? So the coro-
ners' juries frequently decided that the person who had committed
suicide had been insane.2 In fact, the most common verdict returned
by coroners' juries in suicide cases was temporary insanityP The pro-
portion of suicide cases that reached a verdict of insanity steadily in-
creased from the fourteenth century to the nineteenth by which time a
person who had committed suicide was rarely pronounced sane.30
Blackstone complained of this trend, observing that coroners' juries
were using the act of suicide itself to justify a finding of insanity.?'
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, there were public
calls to remove the penalties for suicide.31 It was argued that the se-
verity of the criminal sanctions led to their nonenforcement. 33 React-
ing to this public sentiment, Parliament gradually removed the
punishments for suicide. In 1823 the Right to Burial Act ended the
tradition of ignominious burial at the highway,4 and in 1870 the Abo-
lition of Forfeiture Acts removed the penalty of forfeiture
35
Committing suicide remained a felony, albeit without any punish-
ment, until the Suicide Act of 1961 made it no longer a crime to com-
mit suicide.36
B. Attempted Suicide
In England, the history of attempted suicide paralleled the his-
tory of suicide. Since suicide was a felony at common law, to attempt
suicide was a misdemeanor.37 Offenders were often imprisoned. As
late as the nineteen-fifties, people were being imprisoned for up to
25. Hoffman & Webb, supra note 17, at 377.
26. 4 Wnii BLAci.STotN *189.




31. 4 Wu.L.Am BLAcrKSONE *189.




36. Suicide Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, clh. 60, § 1 (Eng.).
37. Jose P. Cristomo et al., The Right to Die, 55 PL. LJ. 338, 344 (1980).
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two years for attempting suicide.3" However, when the Suicide Act of
1961 decriminalized suicide, it logically followed that to attempt sui-
cide was no longer a crime.39
C. Assisted Suicide
The recent history of assisted suicide in England illustrates the
difficulties of deciding whether to criminalize assisted suicide. On the
one hand, people who, for their own selfish reasons, push others to
commit suicide should be sanctioned. On the other hand, if the cul-
ture gives individuals the choice to commit suicide, they should not be
prevented from exercising that choice. Reconciling these two ex-
tremes in a law is difficult.
When committing suicide was a crime, assisting a suicide was also
a crime under the common law rules of accomplice liability. An abet-
tor who was present at the time of the suicide was considered a princi-
pal to the crime and was punished as such.40 Since suicide was a
felony, and the punishment for all felonies was death, the penalty for
assisting a suicide and being present at its commission was death. 1 If
the abettor was not present at the commission of the crime, then she
was an accessory before the fact.42 However, at common law an ac-
cessory before the fact could not be tried until the principal had been
convicted.4 3 Because a dead person could not be brought to trial, in
the case of a successful suicide an accessory before the fact could
never be punished.44 Therefore, at common law you had the odd re-
suit that the punishment for abetting a suicide depended upon
whether the abettor was present when the suicide was committed.
When Parliament passed the Suicide Act of 1961, decriminalizing
suicide and attempted suicide, it decided to maintain the criminality of
assisting a suicide. It did this by creating a new principal crime-as-
sisting a suicide. Section 2(1) of the Suicide Act provides:
A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the suicide of an-
other, or an attempt by another to commit suicide, shall be liable on
38. GLANvL WLLIAMS, TIm SANcrrrY OF Lim AmD THE CRMrNAL LAW 280-81
(1957).
39. J.C. SmIrH & BRIAN HOGAN, CRMINAL LAW 359 (1988).
40. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 cmt. 1, n.7 (1980); WuuAkM BLAZKSTONE, COMMEIN.
TARIES ON TH= LAWS OF ENGLAND 1356-57 n.2 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., 4th ed., 1899).
41. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 cmt.1, n.7 (1980).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. BLACKSToNE, supra note 40, at 1356-57 n2.
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conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
fourteen years
5
Although the wording of the statute is couched in the language of
accessory liability, liability for this crime is principal in nature.46 This
means that it may serve as the basis for an attempt.40 7 This has had the
odd result of broadening the range of criminal liability for abetting a
suicide. At common law it was not a crime to attempt to abet a
crime.' Now, under the Suicide Act, a person can be prosecuted for
attempting to abet a suicide.49 As one commentator has observed,
"[i]t is ironical that legislation designed to remove the stigma of crimi-
nality from the perpetrator of suicide or attempted suicide has done so
at the expense of the person who attempts to help him achieve that
end., 5
0
Since the passage of the Suicide Act of 1961 there have been two
primary cases dealing with the application of section 2(1): Yolanda
Tregenna McShane5l and Attorney-General v. Able.52 The McShane
case demonstrated the necessity for making certain types of assisted
suicide illegal. It was a case where the assister's choice so overshad-
owed the principal's choice that it was no longer clear that it was the
principal's choice to attempt to commit suicide. When the law was
applied, it was not just the individual's choice to commit suicide
against the society's choice to prevent her. It had become the soci-
ety's choice to prevent the assister from pushing the individual to
choose suicide. The Able case, on the other hand, shows the difficulty
of crafting a law for assisted suicide which does not hinder the individ-
ual from exercising her choice to commit suicide.
In Yolanda Tregenna McShane, the defendant, Yolanda McShane,
was convicted under the Suicide Act for attempting to abet the suicide
of her mother.53 Her mother was in a convalescent home recovering
from a fractured hip.54 After one of Yolanda's visits, her mother went
45. Suicide Act, 1961, § 2(1).
46. KJ.M. Smith, Assisting in Suicide-The Attorney.General and the Voluntary Eu-
thanasia Society, 1983 Ciu& L.R. 579, 579 (1983) [hereinafter Voluntary Euthanasia
Society].
47. Id.
48. Christopher Ash, Complicity in Suicide Publishers at Risk?, 132 NEW LJ. 178,178
(1982).
49. Id at 181.
50. Id.
51. Yolanda Tregenna McShane, 66 Crim. App. 97 (Eng. CA. 1977).
52. Attorney-General v. Able, [1984] 1 Q.B. 795.
53. McShane, 66 Crim. App at 98.
54. Id. at 99.
1995]
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into a coma.55 It was suspected that the coma had been induced by
drugs that Yolanda had given to her mother.56 The mother recovered.
The police hid microphones and a video camera in the mother's room
to observe Yolanda's next visit.57 During her visit, Yolanda was heard
to say to her mother:
Whisky with barbiturates is fatal. If I were convicted I could not get
the money. I wouldn't be allowed to inherit, but if I left you the
means and a week or two from now you took the means then that is
nothing to do with me is it? ... Don't let's make a mess of it this
time. We thought we had done so well before.
5 8
Before she left, Yolanda was seen to pin a packet to the inside of her
mother's clothing.5 9 The packet was found to contain nembutal
tablets.60
At trial it was revealed that Yolanda stood to inherit a large sum
of money when her mother died,6 1 and due to a recent business failure
Yolanda was in serious financial trouble.62 It was evidenced that she
bore no affection for her mother and, seeing her as an obstacle to her
inheritance, wished her dead.63 Yolanda herself admitted that she
wanted her mother to die.6 The court perceived Yolanda's assistance
to be akin to attempted murder. It appeared that her mother's at-
tempted suicide had been not so much her mother's choice as it had
been Yolanda's. This case shows that the logic which renders suicide
and attempted suicide legal does not necessarily apply to the legaliza-
tion of assisted suicide.
While the case of Yolanda Tregenna McShane illustrates a reason
for criminalizing assisted suicide, the case of Attorney-General v. Able
illustrates the difficulty of not making the law too broad. The defend-
ants were board members of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, an or-
ganization dedicated to the legalization of euthanasia. 55 In 1981 the
society distributed a booklet entitled "A Guide to Self-Deliver-
55. Id.
56. Id. at 98.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 100.
59. Id. at 98.
60. Id. Nembutal is a strong barbiturate. MEDICAL ECONOMICS, PHYSICIANS' DESK
REYERENCE 439 (1995). Overdoses induce deep coma and even death. Id.
61. McShane, 66 Crim. App. at 99.
62. Id. at 100.
63. Id. at 99.
64. Id. at 101.
65. Attorney-General v. Able, [1984] 1 Q.B. 795, 801.
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ance." 66 The booklet described various effective and relatively pain-
less methods of committing suicide.67 It also contained several
statements encouraging the reader to think seriously before commit-
ting suicide, and it listed several reasons why a person should not com-
mit suicide.68 It was made available to all members of at three months
standing who were at least twenty-five years old.69
The Attorney-General sought a court declaration that distribu-
tion of the booklet violated section 2(1) of the Suicide Act.70 Follow-
ing McShane, the court held that by distributing the booklet the
society was guilty of attempting to assist suicide under section 2(1) if:
(1) they intended the booklet to be provided to people who were con-
templating suicide, and they intended it to help or encourage them;
and (2) they distributed it to these people with these intentions.71
This holding leaves the English law of assisted suicide very broad and
completely unclear. Anybody who gives information or advice to a
would-be suicide is vulnerable to prosecution. This is an unsatisfac-
tory result because it does not distinguish between cases such as
McShane, where the assister's choice overshadows the principal's
choice, and Able, where the assister is simply providing information to
would-be suicides, but is not pushing them towards it.
mH. SUICIDE LAWS IN INDIA
A. Suicide
In India suicide has historically not been condemned to the same
extent that it has been in England. Although Hinduism, the dominant
religious thought in India, disapproves of suicide in general, in many
circumstances it is tolerated and even acclaimed. 3 Some Hindu texts
state that a person who is very old or very sick and who has no more
desire for life can commit suicide without incurring sin.7 4 Saints, poli-
ticians, and religious leaders have been known to set fire to them-
66. Id. at 801-02.
67. Id. at 803.
68. Id. at 803-04.
69. Id. at 802.
70. Id. at 801.
71. Id. at 812.
72. Voluntary Euthanasia Society, supra note 46, at 586.
73. Faizan Mustafa, Should Section 309, LP.C Continue on the Statute Book?, Sup. Cr.
J. (India), Jan.-Apr. 1993, at 36, 36-37; Dubal v. State of Maharashtra, 88 Bombay L. Rep.
589, 596 (Bombay H.C. 1986).
74. Dubai, 88 Bombay L. Rep. at 595.
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selves.75 This is not condemned by Hindu society, rather it is
commemorated and eulogized. 7 6 There was the medieval Rajput tra-
dition of Johar-a mass suicide committed by the women of a house-
hold to avoid capture by an invading army.77 There is the practice of
samadhi-the termination of one's life by restraint of breathing.78
And then there is the tradition of sad, the self-immolation of a widow
on her husband's funeral pyre, which was, and in some parts of India
still is, treated with reverence.79
When the Moghuls conquered India in the sixteenth century they
imposed Islamic law in all criminal matters.8 0 Islam explicitly forbids
suicide.8' It is a crime against God and society which is worse than
homicide8n It is a crime against God because God created life, and
only He should end it.8 3 It is a crime against society because the indi-
vidual is selfishly repudiating his societal obligations-obligations to
his parents, children, siblings, and friends.84 Even people suffering
from disease, no matter how painful and hopeless, are doomed to hell
if they commit suicide.8 5 Under Islamic law, the society's choice in
this matter is more important than the individual's choice.
The British, who gradually assumed control of India in the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries, drew up the Indian Penal Code in
1837.86 The Code combined elements of English law, Indian law, the
Louisiana Code, and the Code Napoleon.87 Influenced by current
trends in England,' it did not criminalize suicide although attempted
suicide and assisted suicide were criminalized.8 9 The Indian Penal
75. Id. at 597.
76. Id,
77. UPENDRA THAKUR, THE HISTORY OF SuIC= IN INDIA 161-62 (1963); Mustafa,
supra note 73, at 37.
78. Mustafa, supra note 73, at 37.
79. Dubal, 88 Bombay L. Rep. at 597; Mustafa, supra note 73, at 37.
80. D.A. DEsA ET AL-, 1 RATANLAL & DimAn-AL's LAW OF CRimES 1 (23rd ed.
1987).
81. Jalaluddin Umri, Suicide or Termination of Life, 7 IsLAMic & Cor. L.Q. 136, 137
(1987).
82. Dubal, 88 Bombay L. Rep. at 594.
83. Umri, supra note 81, at 138.
84. Id. at 137.
85. Id. at 139. Mohammed is quoted to have said "[hie who commit suicide by throt-
ting shall keep on throtting himself in the Hell-Fire (for ever) and he who commits suicide
by stabbing himself shall keep on stabbing himself in Hell-Fire (for ever)." Mustafa, supra
note 73, at 37.
86. DEsAi Er AL., supra note 80, at 1.
87. Id
88. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
89. INDIA PEN. CODE §§ 305, 306, 309.
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Code remains the criminal law of India,90 and under it suicide is not a
criminal offense.
B. Attempted Suicide
The controversy in India over the criminalization of attempted
suicide demonstrates the problem of criminalizing attempted suicide
when the dominant culture feels it should be the individual's choice.
When the English drew up the Indian Penal Code they criminal-
ized attempted suicide. Under section 309 of the Indian Penal Code,
to attempt to commit suicide is explicitly prohibited.
309. Attempt to commit suicide.- Whoever attempts to commit sui-
cide and does any act towards the commission of such offense, shall
be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend
to one year, or with fine, or with both.9 1
In Indian criminal law, this is the only instance where an attempt to
commit an offense is punishable while the actual commission is not.92
Criminalizing attempted suicide does not fit Hindu culture any-
more than criminalizing suicide itself. Since the nineteen-fifties, after
gaining independence from the British, the Indian judiciary has
looked for ways to avoid enforcing this law.93 Although the judici-
ary's methods of obstructing the law have necessarily relied on legal
mechanisms-from reducing the sentence, to refusing to acknowledge
mens rea, to dismissing a case for procedural reasons, to even declar-
ing the law unconstitutional-the underlying reason is clearly a con-
viction that the society does not have the right to punish an individual
who chooses to end his life. As one Indian commentator has written,
expressing this conviction, "Is it not being barbaric and cruel to a per-
son who fails in extinguishing his 'more-miserable-than-death' life, by
putting him in jail? If the State cannot provide a person with humane
living conditions, can it be just in retrenching his right to die?"'
As was mentioned above, one way to obstruct section 309 has
been to reduce the sentence of persons convicted of attempted sui-
cide. A good example of this is the 1967 case of Valentino v. State.95
90. DEsAI Er AT-, supra note 80, at 2.
91. IND A PEN. CoDEF § 309.
92. D.A. DEsAI Er Aj., 2 RATAm-AL & DHmAJLA.'s LAW OF CfMCEs 1230 (23rd ed.
1988).
93. Girish Kathpalia, Right to Die Controversial Law, LEx ETr JutRs, Apr.-May, 1989,
at 49, 50.
94. Id. at 49.
95. Valentino v. State, 1967 A.IR. (Goa) 138.
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The defendant-out of work, separated from his wife, ignored by his
parents who refused to help him, and starving along with his fifteen-
month-old daughter-apparently grabbed his daughter and jumped
into a well.96 Applying section 309, the trial court sentenced him to
six months hard imprisonment.97 However, the appellate court re-
duced this sentence to the time he had already served--three months
and ten days.98 In ruling the court observed:
The accused had reached the stage of utter destitution and his clos-
est relations were not out to help him even with two square meals a
day.... The accused had to be pitied rather despised if in such
circumstances he took the extreme step of attempting to finish his
life, the most precious gift known to all living things. 9
Another way to obstruct the application of this law has been to
deny the existence of the necessary mens rea.100 In a move similar to
the old English coroners' juries, judges have sometimes considered su-
icidal behavior itself to be evidence of temporary insanity. The 1976
case of Phulabai v. State of Maharashtra'01 is a good example of this.
The defendant, Phulabai, was convicted of attempted suicide. For an
entire year prior to the attempt she had been ill, and in spite of medi-
cal treatment her condition had not improved.12 One night, when the
family was asleep, she collected her one-and-a-half year old son,
Vithal, who was suffering from rickets, tied him to her stomach with
her sari, unchained the door of the house, walked the two hundred
feet to the well, and jumped in.103 At trial she was convicted of at-
tempted suicide.1" However, on appeal she was acquitted on the the-
ory of temporary insanity, even though the only evidence that she had
been temporarily insane was that she had jumped into the well.105
Judge Vaidya wrote:
[W]e have no evidence as to how exactly the accused and Vithal fell
into the well. From the mere fact that they were discovered next
morning, it may be possible to hold that she attempted to commit
suicide by jumping along with her child, but it is also possible that
96. Id. at 139-40.
97. Id at 138.
98. I& at 142.
99. 1&
100. Kathpalia, supra note 93, at 50.
101. Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, 1976 Crim. L.J. 1519 (Bombay H.C. 1976).
102. Id. at 1519.
103. Id.
104. I& at 1519-20.
105. At at 1520-21.
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she was in such unsound state of mind that she did not know what
she was doing when she jumped into the well along with her
child .... The absence of medical evidence does not justify exclu-
sion of common sense.'
°6
The court felt that since she jumped into the well, she was probably
crazy, since only a crazy person would do such a thing.
Another popular approach to obstructing section 309 has been to
dismiss cases on procedural grounds.'07 In 1985, the Delhi High Court
quashed, on procedural grounds,108 all 119 section 309 proceedings
that were pending in the Delhi trial courts.Y°9 In one of the dismissals,
Justice Rajindar Sacchar began his opinion with an ideological attack
on the criminalization of attempted suicide, explaining the underlying
reason for why he was dismissing the case.
It is ironic that Section 309 I.P.C. still continues to be on our Penal
Code. The result is that a young boy driven to such frustration so as
to seek one's own life would have escaped human punishment if he
had succeeded but is to be hounded by the police because attempt
has failed.... Instead of the society hanging its head in shame that
there should be such social strains that a young man (the hope of
tomorrow) should be driven to suicide compounds its inadequacy by
treating the boy as a criminal. Instead of sending the boy to psychi-
atric clinic [sic] it gleefully sends him to mingle with criminals, as if
trying its best to see that in future he does fall foul of the punitive
sections of the Penal Code.... The very idea is revolting. This
concept seeks to meet the challenge of social strains... by ruthless
suppression of mere symptoms-this attempt can only result in
failure.110
This movement of judicial activism culminated in 1986 with the
ruling of the Bombay High Court in Maruti Shripati Dubal v. State of
Maharashtra."' The court found a legal reason for declaring section
309 of the Penal Code unconstitutional.112 It held that the Indian con-
stitution inferred a right to die,"1 and section 309 violated that
right.1
14
106. Id. at 1521.
107. Mustafa, supra note 73, at 39.
108. Id.
109. Kathpalia, supra note 93, at 51.
110. State v. Sanjay Kumar Bhatia, 1985 Crim. LJ. 931, 931-32 (Dellf H.C. 1985).
111. Dubai, 88 Bombay L. Rep. at 596.
112. Id. at 600.
113. Id. at 593.
114. Id. at 600.
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Maruti Shripati Dubal, a police officer with psychiatric problems,
tried to commit suicide by dowsing himself with kerosene and setting
fire to his clothes.115 Fortunately he failed. After being charged with
attempting to commit suicide, he petitioned the High Court challeng-
ing the constitutionality of section 309.116 In its opinion, the court first
observed that the Indian Constitution recognizes a right to live as a
positive right." 7 It then pointed out that all of the fundamental rights
have their corresponding negative aspects: the right to speak includes
the right to remain silent; the right to associate includes the right not
to associate; and the right to do business includes the right to shut
down a business."18 Furthermore, what is true of one fundamental
right is true of the others. 1 9 Therefore, there must exist a negative
aspect of the right to live-the right not to live-or, fa other words,
the right to die.120 Because section 309 violates this right to die, it is
unconstitutional.
12 '
The court then defended this ruling, arguing that it was the just
conclusion. It observed that there is nothing unnatural or wrong
about wanting to die."z People confuse the circumstances which lead
a person to want to die-circumstances that are often wrong and un-
natural-with the person's natural reaction-wanting to die.12 3 They
also confuse the natural wish for death with the unnatural way with
which it is attained-self-starvation, self-strangulation, or, in this case,
self-immolation.2 Although it is usual that a person wants to live,
and unusual that she wants to die, just being unusual does not make it
unnatural.' 5
The court also defended its position by observing that Hindu tra-
ditions honor many forms of suicide:
126 sati,'2 7 johar,'2s samadhi,2 9
115. Id. at 590-91.
116. Id. at 591.
117. Id. at 593.
118. Id., citing Excel Wear v. Union of India, 1978 4 S.C.C. 244.
119. Dubal, 88 Bombay L. Rep. at 593, citing R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, 1970
A.I.R. (Sup. Ct.) 1318.
120. Dubal, 88 Bombay L. Rep. at 593.
121. Id. at 600.
122. Id at 593.
123. Id.
124. Id
125. Id. at 593-94.
126. Id at 597.
127. See infra text accompanying notes 145-67.
128. See supra text accompanying note 77.
129. See supra text accompanying note 78.
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prayopaveshan,'130 and atmanpana.13  However, the court did ac-
knowledge that Islam considers suicide a horrible crime."
Lastly the court argued that suicide is a personal choice.13 3 The
individual is master of his own body and society has no right to tell
him what to do with it.
Suicide involves no damage to person or property of others. If
destruction of one's property or its deliverance to others for a cause
or no cause is not an offence, there is no reason why sacrifice of
one's body for a cause or without a cause or for the mere deliver-
ance of it should be regarded as an offence. Much less an attempt at
doing so. One's life, one's body with all its limbs are certainly one's
property and he is the sole master of it. He should have the free-
dom to dispose of it as and when he desires. Even at present the
relevant statutes permit donation by an individual of certain parts of
his body under certain conditions, thereby recognizing the right of
the individual to deal with his body as he chooses.13
4
The court argued that if a person's life is so bad that he has been
driven to suicide, he should at least be allowed to escape his pain
through death.
135
Some individuals resort to suicide to escape from the cruel condi-
tions of life which are every moment a punishment to them. The
deliverance from such mundane existence is in reality a boon to
them. Yet, society which is either unable or indifferent to improving
his conditions of life, seeks to punish him for his attempt at self-help
or self-deliverance.' 36
The court weighed the individual's interest in self-determination
against the society's interest in preserving the lives of its members. It
looked to the dominant Hindu culture for guidance, and decided that
according to the culture the interest of the individual should win.
The Dubal decision sparked an uproar, generating both criticism,
particularly from the Muslim community, 37 and supporL8 The
130. This is the starving of oneself to death. Dubal, 88 Bombay L Rep. at 597.
131. This is self-sacrifice. Id.
132. Id. at 594.




137. See Umri, supra note 81 (arguing that the decision is vong because it goes against
Islam's explicit prohibition of suicide). See also HLC.M. Patro, Attempt to Suicide As an
Offense" To Be or Not to Be on Statute, 3 SuP. Cr. J.(India) 27 (1988); Mustafa, supra note
73, at 40 (both arguing that the constitutional analysis used by the Dubal court was flawed
and that there is no negative aspect to the right to live).
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Dubal ruling had been appealed to the Supreme Court of India where
it is still pending.
139
C. Assisted Suicide
Under the Indian Penal Code, assisting a suicide is a crime.
140
The structure of the Indian law concerning abetment of suicide shows
that it is oriented towards assisters who push people to commit sui-
cide. This was done by creating two different crimes. Section 306 of
the Penal Code makes the abetment of any suicide illegal:
306. Abetment of Suicide.-If any person commits suicide, whoever
abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with impris-
onment of either description for a term which may extend to ten
years, and shall also be liable to fine.
14 1
Section 305 prescribes a harsher punishment for anyone who abets the
suicide of a child or a person who is mentally incompetent:
305. Abetment of Suicide of Child or Insane Person.-If any person
under eighteen years of age, any insane person, any delirious per-
son, any idiot, or any person in a state of intoxication commits sui-
cide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide shall be
punished with death or imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a
term not exceeding ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
142
Assisting the suicide of a competent adult exposes the assister to a
maximum of ten years in prison, whereas assisting the suicide of a
minor or a person who is mentally incompetent exposes the assister to
a possible life sentence or even the death penalty.
The harsher punishment in section 305 is an attempt to prevent
the suicides of persons who have not really chosen to die. Because it
is believed that children and mentally incompetent persons are more
suggestible than others, and that they may not understand the conse-
quences of their actions, it is feared that they are in greater danger of
being pushed to suicide by unscrupulous people. Hindu culture may
give the individual the choice to commit suicide, 43 but it must be that
individual's choice.
138. See Kathpalia, supra note 93. See also Mishra Srikanta, A Right to Die? A Contro-
versial Question of Law and Medical Ethics, 3 Sup. Cr. J.(India) 61 (1991); Mustafa, supra
note 73 (disagreeing with the court's methodology, but agreeing with the result).
139. So far as the author can tell, the Supreme Court has yet to nle on this case.
140. INDIA PEN. CODE §§ 305, 306.
141. INDIA PEN. CODE § 306.
142. INDIA PEN. CODE § 305.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 73-79.
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The cases which apply the assisted suicide laws show that the laws
are directed towards assisters who, it is believed, are causing a suicide.
Many abetment of suicide prosecutions involve a widow who commits
sati or an abused wife who commits suicide.' These are both situa-
tions where it is often feared that others have driven or even forced
the woman to commit suicide. These cases feel like murder, but they
are hard to prosecute as murder--causation being hard to prove be-
cause -the woman has professed her will to commit suicide and often
has killed herself with her own hand. As a result, the courts fall back
on abetting a suicide. This would more accurately be called causing a
suicide.
Since many of the assisted suicide cases involve sad, a brief dis-
cussion of sad is necessary. Sati is the ancient Hindu custom of burn-
ing a still-living widow along with her husband's body.145 Although it
was most common in Bengal,x  sad has occurred throughout India.147
It reached its high point in popularity between 1680 and 1830.141 As
the British assumed control of India, they tried to eradicate it.149 Af-
ter a series of ever-stricter regulations they finally made it illegal in
1829.150 Since then its frequency has dwindled, but to this day there
are still a few cases of sad every year."
Sati was sometimes voluntary and sometimes it was forced.
Whether most were voluntary or most were forced is disputed. 152
However, it is generally agreed that a significant number were forced:
widows were often drugged and lead to the funeral pyre in a stupor;
153
and once a widow had "agreed" to commit sad, she was often pre-
vented from changing her mind."A Various measures were taken to
ensure that the she did not change her mind: scaffolds might be built
144. See, ag., DESAi ET A., supra note 92, at 1213-14.
145. TAPAs KUMAR BANEREEB, BACKGROUND TO INDIAN CRIMINAL LAW 23 (1990).
146. IL; Dorothy K. Stein, Women to Burn: Suttee As a Normative Institution, 4 SaGs
253, 257 (1978).
147. See Stein, supra note 146, at 257.
148. BANEIUEE, supra note 145, at 26. A survey of the Saugar District of the State of
Madhya Pradesh estimated that between 1450 and 1824,2% of the women became sais.
Doranne Jacobson, The Chaste Wife: Cultural Norm and Individual Experience, in AmU.
CAN STUDIES IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF INDIA 95, 97 (Syvia Vatuk ed., 1978).
149. See BANERnn, supra note 145, at 110-13.
150. Id. at 113.
151. Stein, supra note 146, at 262; Jacobson, supra note 148, at 97.
152. See, &g., BANERjEE, supra note 145, at 25 (most satis in Bengal were forced). But
see Jacobson, supra note 148, at 97 (most satis were voluntary). See also Vina Mazumdar,
Comment on Suttee, 4 SIGNs 269, 269 (1978)(example of a voluntary sat).
153. BArNPjE, supra note 145, at 25.
154. Stein, supra note 146, at 255.
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which tilted towards the fire so that the woman would be dropped into
the flames;155 or the pyre would be built up around the woman with
no exits by which to escape;156 or she might even be tied to the fire-
wood;15 7 and finally, should she manage to clamber to the edge of the
burning pyre, men stood by with sticks to push her back into the
flames.158
Women were compelled to commit sati for both economic and
religious reasons. On the economic side, the husband's family did not
want to have to support the widow.159 Further, the family also wanted
to inherit the husband's estate, which the widow controlled so long as
she remained alive.'60 On the religious side, it was believed that the
sad brought merit upon the whole family, absolving them of their sins
and guaranteeing them a place in paradise.' 6'
Some widows voluntarily committed sati for religious reasons.
The orthodox Hindu woman was raised to believe that she ought to
die before her husband. 62 If he died before her, it was because of her
sins; she had caused his death. 63 However, she could redeem herself
if she committed sati. 64 Furthermore, because sati was eulogized and
the places where widows committed sati became sacred spots, sati was
glamorous. 65 Women also committed sad because they felt death was
probably better than the life they would lead after their husband's
death. Because the life of a widow was often miserable, the glamour




158. BANERJE, supra note 145, at 25; Stein, supra note 146, at 255. Tapas Kumar
Banerjee relates a particularly grisly account of this:
There is a case reported where a woman did succeed, in the dark of a rainy night,
in escaping from the pyre and hiding herself among some brushwood. But the
attendants found her, and her own son dragged her out, and in spite of all her
pleading, tied her hand and foot and threw her back into the flames. (citations
omitted).
BANFRJEE, supra note 145, at 25.
159. BANEREE, supra note 145, at 24.
160. Id.; Stein, supra note 146, at 256.
161. Stein, supra note 146, at 256.
162. Id. at 255.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 256.
165. BANERmE, supra note 145, at 25; Stein, supra note 146, at 254-55, 262; see Jacob-
son, supra note 148, at 130-33.
166. Stein, supra note 146, at 254. The life of a widow was very strict:
[S]he should not eat more than one very plain meal a day.... she should perform
the most menial tasks, never sleep in a bed, leave the house only to go to the
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two choices, a painful but relatively brief and heroic death, or a miser-
able, obscure, and humiliating life as a penitent sinner."16 7
Two sati cases-Emperor v. Ram Dayal'6 and King-Emperor v.
Vidyasagar Pande169-- illustrate the situation where a woman has com-
mitted sad, but in the court's mind she has been murdered. In Ram
Dayal, although the sad appeared to be voluntary, somebody must
have lit the pyre and thereby committed murder. However, because it
could not be shown who had actually lit the pyre, the court had to
settle for abetting a suicide. In Vidyasagar Pande, the sati appeared to
be forced, but again it could not be shown who had lit the pyre. And
so again the court had to settle for abetting a suicide.
In Emperor v. Ram Dayal a Brahman named Ram Lal had died,
and his wife had announced that she would commit sad.' 70 Her family
argued with her, but she insisted.' 71 One of the village guards was
sent to the closest police station, ostensibly to warn the authorities.172
However, since the station was eight miles away, 73 the earliest the
police could arrive was that afternoon. 74 According to the five ac-
cused, the widow threatened to curse them if they did not allow her to
commit sati,17 and at nine that morning she ordered that the funeral
pyre be built. 76 The accused carried the body to the burning ghat,177
built the pyre, and placed the body upon it. 78 The widow climbed
onto the pyre, and two of the five accused helped the widow perform
the necessary ceremonies prior to committing satd. 179 The defendants
claimed that they had refused to light the pyre, and so the widow had
prayed to God and the pyre had miraculously burst into flame."s
temple, keep out of sight at festivals (since she was inauspicious to everyone but
her own children), wear nothing but the drabbest clothes, and, of course, no jew-
elry. Perhaps most humiliating of all for a high-born lady was having her head
shaved monthly by an untouchable male barber. (citations omitted).
Id. at 255.
167. IM. at 254-55.
168. 36 Indian L.R. (Allahabad) 26 (Allahabad H.C. 1914).
169. 8 Indian L.L (Patna) 74 (Patna H.C. 1929).




174. Id. at 30.
175. Id. at 29.
176. Id. at 28.
177. The burning ghat is the place on the river bank where bodies are cremated.
178. Ram Dayal, 36 Indian L.R. (Allahabad) at 28.
179. Id. at 28-29.
180. Id. at 29.
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The trial court convicted the five defendants of abetting a sui-
cide, 81 and the High Court of Allahabad affirmed the convictions.
182
The High Court rejected the defendants' argument thai: they had actu-
ally tried to prevent the sati.183 The court observed that if the defend-
ants had truly wanted to prevent the sati it would have been very easy
for them.184 They could have waited a few hours for the police to
arrive before building the pyre, 85 or they could have prevented the
widow from mounting the pyre. is6 Although they may at first have
argued with the widow about committing sati, they gave in to her de-
termination and did all that was necessary to enable her to commit
sati.'87 Not only did the court decide that the defendants had wanted
the woman to commit sati, it is apparent from the opinion that the
court believed that the defendants had probably lit the pyre-that
they had crossed the line from assisting a suicide to committing a
murder:
The witnesses and the accused also have told stories of miraculous
deeds done by the widow that morning .... It is clear that the
sympathies of the witnesses are naturally with the accused and that
there is a conspiracy of silence as to who actually fired the funeral
pyre. It is equally clear that the miraculous stories have been in-
vented for this purpose.1
88
But since it could not be proved who had lit the pyre, the court had to
settle for a conviction of abetting a suicide. The court felt murder had
been committed, but causation could not be proved.
King-Emperor v. Vidyasagar Pande is a more extreme case. Here
the sati was forced. Again the court believed that the defendants had
committed murder, but again it could not be proved who had actually
lit the pyre and so again the court had to settle for abetting a suicide.
The widow, Sampati Kuer, was only twenty years old.' She had mar-
ried her husband ten or twelve years before, but had continued to live
in her father's house.i 90 She did not go to live with her husband until
181. Ict at 26-27.
182. Ia. at 32-33.




187. I& at 30-31.
188. Id. at 29.
189. Vdyasagar Pande, 8 Indian L.R. (Patna) at 76.
190. Id.
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he lay dying, a few months before his death.191 When her husband
died, the only close relative with her was her younger brother.192 She
hardly knew her husband's relatives. The accused, a collection of her
husband's relatives, her brother, and some local villagers had decided
that she was to commit sai.193 Although Sampati at first agreed to
commit sati, she later changed her mind. 94 However, the defendants,
accompanied by a chanting crowd of four or five thousand people,
took her to the burning ghat.195 The police tried unsuccessfully to stop
them. At the ghat she bathed in the river, performed the necessary
rituals, and mounted the funeral pyre.196 A moment later, it burst into
flame.'97 It could not be determined who had actually lit the pyre.198
Upon feeling the pain of the flames, Sampati leapt from the fire into
the river."9 The defendants shouted at her to drown herself and tried
to prevent the police from rescuing her.2°° When she got to the shore,
horribly burned, the police tried to take her away to a hospital, but
they were driven off by the crowd. 01 A doctor tried to give her an
injection to relieve her suffering, but he too was driven away.2°z For
two days she lay there suffering.20 3 As she lay there, people threw
coins to her which the defendants, in the words of the court, "greedily
picked up."2°4 Finally the police managed to rescue her.20 5 A day
later she died.0 6
The court felt that the accused had murdered her, but causation
could not be proved. The court believed that the defendants, realizing
they could be convicted for murder, had carefully disguised the
method by which they had lit the pyre:
Now, note the situation. If the Pandes themselves set fire to the
pyre they were under the observation of the police and they knew
perfectly well that their necks would be in the hangman's noose.
191. Iat
192. Id.
193. Id. at 77.
194. Id. at 77-78.
195. Id. at 77-80.
196. Id at 80.
197. Id
198. Id
199. Id. at 80-81.
200. Id at 81.
201. See id
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Moreover, if they themselves set fire to the pyre there would have
been no miracle of heaven-sent fire.2 7
Judging from where the flames began, the court believed that the de-
fendants had placed an incendiary device in Sampati',; clothing.
Flames burst from her clothing and the cause of those flames is no
matter of surmise as we are asked to believe. We are not fools....
The trick was simpler than any conjurer's trick at a country fair and
it was the Pandes who performed it.
208
As in Ram Dayal, the court in Vidyasagar Pande believed that the
defendants had committed murder, but did not have sufficient evi-
dence to convict the accused of murder. So the court had to settle for
a conviction of abetting a suicide.
A case which illustrates the problem of an abused wife being
driven to suicide by an in-law is Bri] Lal v. Prem Chand.2°9 The de-
fendant, Prem Chand, was convicted under section 306 for abetting
the suicide of his wife, Veena Rani.210 Prem had subjected Veena to
continuous abuse, reducing her life to a miserable edstence.211 He
beat her frequently21 2 and although she worked very hard and spent
all of her money on him and the household, he tormented her to give
him more money.21 3 On the day that she committed suicide she had
quarrelled with Prem.214 He had demanded that she give him 1,000
rupees so he could buy a scooter.215 However, she did not have 1,000
rupees.2 6 So she wrote her mother and brother asking them for the
money.217 Even so, Prem did not relent and continued to demand that
she give him the money immediately.218 Distraught over the continu-
ous demands for money, she told him that she preferred death to life
in this world.219 Prem replied that she would provide him with relief
quicker by dying that day rather than waiting until the next,2 0 and
207. Id. at 80.
208. Id.
209. 76 A.R. (Sup. Ct.) 1661 (1989).
210. I. at 1667.
211. Id. at 1665.
212. I& at 1662.
213. Id.






220. Id at 1664.
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that she could go to hell so long as he received the money.? 1 Veena
then went into her house and set herself on fire.2m She died an hour
later from the burns32 The court held that Prem's longstanding
abuse of Veena coupled with his words that she may as well end her
life that day had caused her suicide.2 -4 Her suicide had been not so
much her choice as his. The court wrote:
In the instant case, we have already seen that the committing of
suicide by Veena Rani was due to the accused's instigation. It is not
a case where Veena Rani had wanted to commit suicide for reasons
of her own and the accused had facilitated her in the commission of
suicide.?
The court clearly believed that Prem had caused Veena's death.2 6
India's use of laws against assisted suicide show that even if sui-
cide and attempted suicide are legal, there can still be good reasons to
criminalize assisted suicide under certain circumstances. Even though
a culture may decide that the individual has the right to choose sui-
cide, it must still be that individual's choice. The difficulty with as-
sisted suicide occurs when it is unclear whether the suicide is the
individual's choice or the assister's wish.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the United States suicide is generally not criminalized. There
is no state which by statute makes the commission of suicide a
crime?2 7 Even in the minority of states which retain common law
crimes, although suicide remains technically a crime, it is never prose-
cuted 28 Also, there is no state which statutorily makes attempted
221. Id. at 1663.
222. Id. at 1664.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1665-66.
225. Id. at 1668.
226. In India, the problem of husbands driving their wives to suicide is significant. To
deal with this problem, Section 113A was added to the Indian Evidence Act in 1983. Id. at
1669; A.N. SAHA, CRMmNAL R FEmEcE 977 (4th ed., 1988). Section 113A creates a re-
buttable presumption that a woman's suicide was abetted by her husband or one of his
relatives. SAHA, supra at 977. The presumption is established if the following facts exist:
"(a) the suicide must have been committed within seven years of marriage; [and] (b) the
husband or relative of her husband must have subjected her to cruelty . I..." d.
227. Shaffer, supra note 4, at 348.
228. Seiden, supra note 2, at 1526-27.
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suicide a crime.2 9 However, in almost half of the states it is criminal
to assist a suicide. 3°
The debate over the criminalization of assisted suicide has re-
cently been kindled by Dr. Jack Kevorkian. Dr. Kevorkian, a retired
pathologist from Michigan, 31 has assisted twenty-one suicides since
1990.232 The people he assisted were suffering from very painful,
often terminal, diseases.3 3 In reaction, the Michigan legislature con-
demned Kevorkian's actions by criminalizing assisted suicide.234
However, Jack Kevorkian has also generated support. Opinion polls
consistently show that there is widespread support for assisted
suicide.35
In November 1994, Oregon voters passed Measure 16 which le-
galized physician-assisted suicide in certain circumstances: 236 two doc-
tors must agree that the person's condition is terminal and that she
has no more than six months to live,23 7 the patient aust twice ask
orally for the drugs and then a third time in writing,2 38 and finally the
patient must administer the drugs herself.239 Catholic, Jewish, Mus-
lim, Buddhist, and sixteen other Christian denominations opposed the
measure.240 The Catholic Church itself spent one and a half million
229. Shaffer, supra note 4, at 348.
230. See id. Because assisted suicide is such a controversial topic, the number of states
criminalizing assisted suicide fluctuates. As discussed below, Michigan recently criminal-
ized assisted suicide while Oregon recently legalized it.
231. 7Tventy-First Kevorkian-Assisted Suicide Is Declared a Homicide, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
27, 1994, at A22.
232. Nation in Brief- Michigan. Assisted Suicide Ban Held Constitutional, L.A. TiMvs,
Dec. 14, 1994, at A21 [hereinafter Nation in Brief].
233. See, eg., 71venty-First Kevorkian-Assisted Suicide Is Declared a Homicide, supra
note 231 (assisting the suicide of a woman who had, among other ailments, rheumatoid
arthritis, colonic diverticulitis, and osteoporosis and who had had both of her legs ampu-
tated and had lost one of her eyes.); Michael Granberry, State to Revoke Medical License
of 'Dr. Death', Euthanasia. Jack Kevorkian Gained Worldwide Note for Helping 20 People,
Including Costa Mesa Man, End Lives, L.A. TimEs, July 28, 1994, at B t (assisting the sui-
cides of two women with terminal cancer).
234. See Nation in Brief, supra note 232.
235. Cynthia Hubert, Euthanasia Advocates Win 71vo Key Court Rulings; Kevorklan
Decision, Washington Case Indicate Growing Acceptance of "Right to Die" Principles, S.F.
EXAMINER, May 22, 1994, at A8.





240. Measure on Suicide Fought by Churches, L.A. TimEs, Nov. 5, 1994, at B4.
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dollars fighting it.24' In the end, Measure 16 barely passed, fifty-one
to forty-nine percent.242
As the experiences of England and India show, it is not entirely
illogical to criminalize assisted suicide even when suicide and at-
tempted suicide are not criminalized. When a society does not
criminalize suicide and attempted suicide, it is deciding that the indi-
vidual's choice in this matter is more important than the society's
choice; but when a society criminalizes assisted suicide, it is often do-
ing this because it is afraid that individuals will be pushed to commit
suicide. This is a fear that has been expressed by the opponents of
assisted suicide in the United States?4 3 However, if the culture has
accepted that individuals have the right to choose suicide, then the
continued criminalization of all assisted suicide will be hard to main-
tain. Already, it is not uncommon for doctors to secretly help patients
to die.244 Nevertheless, the worries of the opponents of assisted sui-
cide must be addressed, particularly the worry that people will be
pushed to commit suicide. A law such as Oregon's measure 16 is a
good step in this direction. It requires continued proactive action by
the individual who wants to commit suicide. This helps to keep clear
who is making the choice to commit suicide. As England's experience
with suicide and India's experience with attempted suicide have
shown, if the culture has determined that in certain circumstances in-
dividuals should be helped to commit suicide, it is futile to resist.
241. Cynthia Hubert, New Assisted Suicide Law Splits Oregon, SAcRAMENro BEE,
Nov. 20, 1994, at Al.
242. Id.
243. Cynthia Hubert, supra note 235.
244. See Ud See also Oregon Voters Allow Assisted Suicide for the Terminally Ill, supra
note 236.
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